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1.1. Introduction 
 
Algorithms have come to shape our daily lives and realities. They change the perception of 
the world, affect our behavior by influencing our choices, and are an important source of 
social order. Algorithms on the Internet have significant economic implications in newly 
emerging markets and for existing markets in various sectors. A wide range of our daily 
activities in general and our media consumption in particular are increasingly shaped by 
algorithms operating behind the scenes: the selection of online news via search engines and 
news aggregators, the consumption of music and video entertainment via recommender 
systems, the choice of services and products in online shops and the selection of status 
messages displayed on social online networks are the most prominent examples of this 
omnipresent trend. Algorithms suggest friends, news, songs and travel routes. Moreover, they 
automatically produce news articles and messages, they calculate scorings of content and 
people, and are employed to observe our behavior and interests as well as to predict our future 
needs and actions. By assigning relevance to certain pieces of information they keep 
consumers, companies and authorities from drowning in a growing flood of information and 
online data. At the same time, they mine and construct realities, guide our actions and thereby 
determine the economic success of products and services. Algorithms form the techno-
functional basis of new services and business models that economically challenge traditional 
industries and business strategies. These economic changes and challenges are accompanied 
by and interact with significant social risks such as manipulation and bias, threats to privacy 
and violations of intellectual property rights that compromise the economic and social welfare 
effects of algorithmic selection applications. 
 This rapidly growing Internet phenomenon is here called ‘algorithmic selection’. It is a 
central and structuring bundle of Internet innovations in digital economies. Algorithmic 
selection is embedded in a variety of Internet-based services and is applied for numerous 
purposes. Although their modes of operation differ in detail, all of these applications are 
characterized by a common basic functionality: They automatically select information 
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elements and assign relevance to them. This common feature defines the properties of 
algorithmic selection and facilitates a formal distinction from other Internet phenomena such 
as Web 2.0 (O’Reilly 2007), the Internet of things (Ashton 2009; Mattern and Flörkemeier 
2010) and big data. 
 The development of algorithmic selection is closely related to a number of techno-
economic and social trends in information societies, including computerization, big data, 
personalization, automation and economic optimization. In essence, its diffusion and growing 
importance is fueled by the combination of ubiquitous computerization and the proliferation 
of an increasingly mobile Internet. In a growing number of economic and social domains, the 
spread of algorithmic selection is driven by the diffusion of online information, 
communication and transactions. Computers and the Internet serve as enabling technologies 
that provide the infrastructure – the technological and functional precondition for a wide 
range of applications. At the same time, ubiquitous computerization and Internet use generate 
additional demand for algorithmic selection, because they result in a massive proliferation of 
data volumes and a growing need for orientation by selection. These (big) data form the raw 
material (World Economic Forum 2011a) for algorithmic selection, create economic 
opportunities and call for data/reality-mining tools in order to harness the economic 
opportunities. Altogether, the combination of technological, data-based opportunities and 
economic demand for selection is a major driver for the establishment of new industries, 
applications and business models, where automation of data processing plays a central role, 
and algorithmic selection perfectly supports business strategies, especially in terms of process 
optimizations. Automated algorithmic selection advances optimizations in various ways: 
faster processing of larger amounts of data by automation; cost reductions in production and 
transmission by automation of data processing; strategic enhancements by increased data-
driven, evidence-based decision-making (McAfee and Brynjolfsson 2012); and 
personalization by mass-customization of products and services that are tailored to meet 
diverse consumer needs. 
 With a high potential for economic improvement, algorithmic selection services are 
spreading fast in a wide range of industries. As argued for big data (OECD 2013), their 
diffusion is especially high in sectors characterized by a high degree of digitization and high 
data intensity. Accordingly, it already plays a major role in industries that rely heavily on 
digital production and online transmission such as Internet search, news, advertising, 
entertainment and social online networks. Further, algorithmic selection has gained 
importance in areas such as retail, trade, the stock exchange, banking, insurance, politics, 
 3 
security, intelligence, transportation, logistics, science, education, health, and employment 
(Latzer et al. 2014). Given the combination of ubiquitous computerization, rapidly growing 
amounts of available data, and economic pressure for optimizations, the trend towards 
increased algorithmic selection in a rising number of domains seems to be irreversible. This 
provides the starting point and the rationale for more in-depth analyses on the characteristics, 
role and consequences of algorithmic selection for markets and societies. 
 Most social-science research on algorithms has focused on search engines (Varian 
2006; Machill and Beiler 2007; Lewandowski 2012; König and Ramsch 2014) and 
recommendation systems (Resnick and Varian 1997; Senecal and Nantel 2004; Klahold 2009; 
Jannach et al. 2011; Ricci et al. 2011; Robillard et al. 2014). This paper extends the scope of 
analysis and provides a comprehensive overview of this phenomenon, with a special focus on 
how to think economically about algorithmic selection. It explores the characteristics and 
implications of a rapidly growing Internet phenomenon that automates nothing less than the 
commercialization of reality mining and reality construction in information societies. The 
following questions are tackled: How can the plethora of algorithmic selection applications on 
the Internet be analytically grasped and categorized? How does algorithmic selection operate 
and where is it applied? What market structures and business models are evolving and how do 
they affect existing media markets? What are the major social and economic benefits and 
risks of algorithmic selection, and what governance choices are available to minimize risks 
and thus maximize economic and social welfare?   
 The paper proceeds as follows: The next section offers a typology of algorithmic 
selection applications and provides a basic input-throughput-output model in order to show 
the functioning and economic purposes of the different types of algorithmic selection. Section 
three explains the theoretical perspective applied for its analysis. Section four presents results 
from market analyses and shows the different market phases of algorithmic-selection markets, 
explores market structures and explains concentration tendencies. Section five provides 
insights into business models of algorithmic selection with an emphasis on value proposition, 
value creation and revenue streams. Section six examines selected implications of algorithmic 
selection for traditional media markets and the incumbents’ profitability. Section seven 
identifies areas of risk, such as the violation of basic rights, the changing perception of the 
world and the impact of algorithmic selection on human development. Finally, section eight 
summarizes regulatory challenges and discusses opportunities and limitations of available 
governance choices such as market solutions, self-regulation and state intervention. Section 
nine draws conclusions about the economics of algorithmic selection. 
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1.2. The operation model and functional typology 
 
Algorithmic selection is applied for a number of purposes. It is the technological basis or 
functional feature of many of the most popular and economically successful Internet services, 
among other things, by Google, Facebook, Amazon, Netflix or Spotify. Applications and 
groups of services based on algorithmic selection often contain prefixes such as ‘algorithmic’ 
or simply ‘algo’ (e.g., algo trading), ‘computerized’ or ‘computational’ (e.g., computational 
advertising), ‘smart’ or ‘intelligent’ (e.g., intelligent filtering). This plurality of applications, 
services and terms constitutes a challenge for research. In order to explore algorithmic 
selection it has to be defined and distinguished from other phenomena. Moreover, it is 
helpful, to differentiate certain groups of applications in order to compare and contrast 
functions, markets and risks associated with certain types of application. 
 Although there are infinite definitions of algorithm, it can generally be described as a 
finite series of precisely described rules or processes to solve a problem. It is a sequence of 
stages that transforms input through specified computational procedures (throughput) into 
output (Cormen et al. 2009; Mössenböck 2014). Generally, all algorithmic selection 
applications can be described with the help of a basic input-throughput-output model (I-T-O), 
depicted in Figure 1.1. 
 
Figure 1.1: Input-Throughput-Output model of algorithmic selection on the Internet 
 
Source: Based on Latzer et al. 2014 
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The centerpiece of this process model is the throughput stage where the algorithms 
operate that define the input-output relationship. Starting from a user request and available 
user characteristics they apply statistical operations to select elements from a basic data set 
(DS1) and assign relevance to them. Accordingly, algorithmic selection on the Internet is 
defined as a process that assigns relevance to information elements of a data set by an 
automated, statistical assessment of decentrally generated data signals. In detail, input, 
throughput and output vary for different applications and services. In many cases, big data 
serve as input, but there is a wide spectrum of input sources, depending on the field of 
application. The throughput process is characterized by the assignment of relevance (A2) and 
respective selections (A1), and there is a multitude of different codes based on different 
operating modes (e.g., matching, sorting or filtering algorithms). Finally, the output (DS3) 
also takes on different forms (e.g., rankings, recommendations, biddings, text, music). In 
many cases, it also serves as an additional input for subsequent algorithmic selection 
processes. 
 Applications can be differentiated according to their central function, i.e. the general 
purpose that these applications serve. Here, a functional typology is proposed that covers nine 
categories (Table 1.1). It should be kept in mind, though, that these categories are neither 
meant to be all-embracing nor mutually exclusive.  
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Table 1.1: Functional typology of algorithmic selection applications 
Type Examples 
search applications general search engines (e.g., Google search, Bing, Baidu) 
special search engines (e.g., genealogy: Mocavo, pictures: Shutterstock, social 
media: Social Mention) 
meta search engines (e.g., Dogpile, Info.com) 
semantic search engines (e.g., Yummly) 
questions & answers services (e.g., Ask.com) 
aggregation applications news aggregators (e.g., Google News, nachrichten.de) 
observation/surveillance applications government/intelligence surveillance (e.g., Raytheon RIOT) 
monitoring of corporate/private ICT infrastructures  and usage (e.g., Spector, 
Spytec, Splunk) 
detection of illegal content (e.g., PhotoDNA for child pornography) 
prognosis/forecast applications predictive policing (e.g., PredPol), predictive profiling 
predicting developments: e.g., success of music (scoreAhit, Music Xray), 
diffusion of diseases (Google Flu Trends)  
filtering applications spam filter (e.g., Norton) 
child protection filter (e.g., Net Nanny) 
recommendation applications recommender systems: e.g., for music (Spotify), films (Netflix) 
scoring applications reputation systems: music, film, etc. (e.g., ebay’s buyer/seller reviews) 
news scoring (e.g., reddit, Digg) 
credit scoring (e.g., Creditkarma) 
social scoring (e.g., Klout) 
content production applications algorithmic journalism (e.g., Quill; Quakebot) 
allocation applications computational advertising (e.g., Google AdSense, Yahoo! Bing Network) 
algorithmic trading (e.g., Quantopian) 
Source: Based on Latzer et al. 2014 
 
Search applications have become indispensable tools for exploring the Internet and are 
the most widespread algorithmic services with great economic significance. Relevance is 
assigned to elements according to the best fit with user’s queries. Alongside general-purpose 
algorithmic search engines such as Google and Bing, there is a vast number of applications 
for special (vertical) searching in particular domains or regarding particular issues (e.g., 
Mocavo, a genealogy search engine). General search engines play an important role in the 
growing branch of e-commerce, which has led to the development of connected industries of 
web-content production and website optimization (known as search engine optimization, 
SEO, agencies) as well as search engine marketing specialists (SEM). The gatekeeping role of 
general search engines and especially the dominant market position of Google are highly 
contested issues in the public debate. 
Aggregation applications, most prominently news aggregators such as Google News, 
collect, categorize and regroup information from multiple sources into one single point of 
access (Zhu et al. 2001; Águila-Obra et al 2007; Calin et al. 2013). Unlike syndicators, 
aggregators often acquire the data they offer (e.g., news) without paying. This business model 
has attracted severe criticism and debate, especially regarding the impact on the profitability 
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of other media industries (in particular newspapers) and alleged intellectual property rights 
violations (Isbell 2010; Weaver 2013). 
Observation/surveillance applications such as Raytheon’s Rapid Information Overlay 
Technology (RIOT) have gained prominence lately and were heavily criticized in the context 
of the NSA scandal (Greenwald and MacAskill 2013). Not only do secret-service agencies 
make use of algorithmic surveillance, but companies also employ surveillance technologies, 
for example, for social sorting (Lyon 2003), to control their networks, employees (Ciocchetti 
2011) and customers (Pridmore and Zwick 2011). Many applications monitor online behavior 
in order to detect abnormalities associated with certain risks (e.g., credit-card fraud, cyber 
attacks). Moreover, for several other algorithmic applications, such as forecasting services or 
computational advertising, observation and surveillance are a basic function. 
Prognosis/forecast applications aim at predicting future behavior or scenarios (Küsters 
et al. 2006; Issenberg 2012; Silver 2012), for instance, in areas such as consumption, natural 
disasters, entertainment hits and crime. Respective applications, such as the predictive 
policing technology PredPol are of particular importance in the context of big data analyses. 
The distinction between surveillance applications and forecast applications is often not clear-
cut, as both employ similar data/reality mining methods, or are applied in combination. To 
distinguish them, surveillance applications are sometimes called ‘now-casting’ applications 
(Banbura et al. 2010; Faigle 2010), which points to time as differentiating factor. Surveillance 
refers to the present (real time), while forecasting relates to future occurrences. 
Filtering applications such as the Norton spam filter often work behind the scenes as 
passive or active information filters (Hanani et al. 2001). Passive filters select certain 
elements, but instead of displaying these to the user, they prevent access to them. Algorithmic 
or intelligent filtering is applied, for instance, to counter spam or malware. However, filtering 
is also used to block political information, especially in authoritarian regimes (Deibert et al. 
2008, 2010). 
Recommendation applications such as music recommendations by Spotify are among 
the most widely known services. These online applications are intended to replace traditional 
recommendations by shop assistants or friends. To provide the most fitting recommendations 
they apply various filtering methods relying on data concerning the item, the user, or the 
artificial group a user is assigned to (Klahold 2009). Recommender systems are very common 
in e-commerce and play an important role for increasing sales by reducing search costs and 
building e-trust (Pathak et al. 2010). 
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Scoring applications such as eBay’s reputation system gather and process feedback 
about participants’ behavior and derive ratings and scores relating to behavior from this 
(Resnick and Zeckhauser 2002). A central purpose of these services is to build trust in an 
anonymous online environment and reduce transaction costs. Applications include sensitive 
areas such as credit scoring (Rothmann et al. 2014) or social scoring (measuring a person’s 
creditworthiness or social resources). Accordingly, these systems involve considerable risks 
of social discrimination on the grounds of a person’s race, age or religion and may infringe 
personal privacy (Bostic and Calem 2003; Pavlov et al. 2004; Steinbrecher 2006). 
Furthermore, algorithms can be used to create content automatically, for example, 
with applications such as Quill, developed by Narrative Science. These developments have 
recently been discussed under terms such as algorithmic, automated or robotic journalism 
(Levy 2012; Steiner 2012; Anderson 2013; Wallace and Dörr 2015). Automated production is 
not limited to text (e.g., tweets, news articles, business reports) but music production is 
affected as well. It allows for massive content production and contains the potential for the 
further rationalization and commercialization of media production. These applications touch 
deeply upon human areas of creativity and expression, leading to a revival of discussions 
about artificial intelligence software. 
Allocation applications independently and automatically conduct transactions (e.g., 
placement of ads) and allocate resources (Lee 2007; Varian 2009; Leinweber 2009). 
Algorithmic trading software or computational advertising services such as Google AdSense 
are good examples of such applications. Computational advertising especially is the core 
revenue source for many online platforms such as search and social online networks (Evans 
2008). 
 
1.3. The innovation–co-evolution–complexity perspective 
 
The Internet is a multipurpose infrastructure for innumerable and highly diverse applications. 
This considerably limits the prospects of deriving generalized economic consequences. The 
identification and focus on one distinct set of Internet-based innovations – algorithmic 
selection – is an effort to take a more differentiated look at its economic and social 
implications. Other analytical challenges are the great significance of technological change 
and its interplay with economic, political and social transformations. 
This paper starts from an integrated innovation–co-evolution–complexity perspective 
(Latzer 2013a), which conceives media change as an innovation-driven, co-evolutionary 
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process in a complex environment, marked by adaptive, non-linear system behavior. 
Algorithmic selection by search engines and recommendation systems on the micro-level, for 
example, result in unpredictable, unintended emergent effects on the link structure of the 
WWW at the macro level. Accordingly, the Internet is understood as an open adaptive 
system, an ‘innovation machine’ because of its specific (end-to-end) architectural design 
(Whitt and Schultze 2009; Van Schewick 2010). Co-evolution – sometimes addressed as co-
construction or confluence (Benkler 2006) – is a durable relation between agents that 
influence each other’s evolutionary paths. Hence, according to a complexity economics 
perspective (Beinhocker 2006), processes in economics, politics, technology and society are 
driven by mutually selective pressure or adaption. This explains the reciprocal interplay – 
more precisely the pressure and adaptive behavior of technology, organizations and business 
models that nurture each other. The advantages of such a co-evolutionary perspective include 
its contribution to better understanding and integrating evolutionary technological change 
(Ziman 2000) – where technology is not only output but also input into the economy; to 
overcome the antagonism of technological and social determinism (Rip 2007), and to direct 
the focus from static assessments to dynamic approaches. Finally, such a co-evolutionary 
perspective results in other (adaptive) strategies for media management and governance than 
traditional approaches alone, due to an acknowledgement of the limited predictability and 
steerability of dynamic co-evolutionary developments (Latzer 2013b, 2014). 
Selecting and relevance-assigning algorithms on the Internet can be understood, with 
reference to Bresnahan (2010), as micro general-purpose technologies, as widely used 
clusters of (radical) innovations that enable and trigger innovations in many other economic 
sectors, because they offer not one specific solution but various new opportunities. The co-
evolution with political, economic and cultural factors determines what opportunities will 
ultimately be used and what the consequences will be for socio-economic welfare. 
Governance activities to minimize risks – discussed below – are closely interlinked with 
economic factors and also interact with technological characteristics. 
Algorithmic selection can lead to creative destruction, and has even the potential to be 
a disruptive technology (Christensen 1997), a special form of creative destruction marked by 
inferior technology and the replacement of incumbents (low-end disruption, e.g., credit 
scoring, and new market disruptions, e.g., computational advertising). Innovations are co-
evolutionary, adaptive processes of renewal, marked by variation, selection and adaptive 
reactions. Corporations play a crucial role in selection processes of technologies and of 
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appropriate business models. This will be described in the following sections of this paper, 
together with other characteristics of algorithmic selection markets and their market phases. 
Starting from an innovation-co-evolution-complexity perspective, several other 
approaches help to better understand algorithmic selection. The power of technology and the 
ability of algorithms to shape realities and societies has been variously discussed by 
researchers and journalists who focus, among other things, on the role of algorithms as agents 
(Machill and Beiler 2007), institutions (Napoli 2013), ideologies (Mager 2012) and 
gatekeepers (Jürgens et al. 2011; Wallace and Dörr 2015). An institutional point of view, for 
example, highlights the enabling and restricting role of technologies in general and of 
algorithms in particular. 
Further, algorithmic selection can be conceived as a mode of intermediation (Águila-
Obra et al. 2007), which is central, for example, to understanding platforms and multisided 
markets. It connects supply and demand, i.e. providers and consumers of products and 
content. Algorithms are involved in the allocation of resources, and often have the role of 
market makers in the value-creation system – discussed below. Additionally, the 
intermediation perspective highlights the role as gatekeeper and its effects on the public 
sphere and public-opinion formation as well as its role in the algorithmic construction of 
realities. 
 
1.4. Markets, market phases and structures 
 
Algorithmic selection is creating new Internet-based markets and changing existing ones on a 
large scale. It can constitute the (economic) core function of Internet-based services, for 
example in the case of the general search services of Google or Microsoft, and/or it is applied 
as an ancillary function, for example in e-commerce applications for 
filtering/recommendation purposes by Amazon, or for the automated selection of status 
messages displayed in online social media applications by Facebook. Core function basically 
means that the result of algorithmic selections is the demanded product; ancillary functions 
are used to support the core service of a company in order to gain competitive advantage. 
 Altogether, almost all of the most popular and economically successful Internet-based 
services rely heavily on algorithmic selection in one form or another. Table 1.2 shows the ten 
most visited websites worldwide in 2014 and their applications based on algorithmic selection 
as a core and/or ancillary service. Seven of these rely heavily on computational advertising, 
and four on general search engines. Three websites use algorithmic selection as an ancillary 
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service only (Wikipedia and two online-shopping platforms). Further, the dominance of US 
(7) and Chinese (3) companies is striking. 
 
Table 1.2: Algorithmic selection in top 10 websites worldwide 
Ranking Website Company and country of origin 
Algorithmic Selection as 
 Core Service 
Algorithmic Selection as 
Ancillary Service 
1 google.com Google (USA) general search engine computational advertising autocomplete 
2 facebook.com Facebook (USA) computational advertising 
filtering (EdgeRank) 
social search (GraphSearch) 
recommendations (contacts) 
3 youtube.com Google (USA) computational advertising recommendations (videos) special search engine 
4 yahoo.com Yahoo (USA) general search engine computational advertising autocomplete 
5 baidu.com Baidu (CHN) general search engine computational advertising autocomplete 
6 wikipedia.org Wikimedia Foundation (USA)  special search engine 
7 twitter.com Twitter (USA) computational advertising recommendations (Twitter Trends, Who to Follow) 
8 qq.com Tencent (CHN) general search engine computational advertising autocomplete 
9 taobao.com Alibaba Group (CHN)  
special search (products) 
recommendations (products) 
reputation (marketplace sellers) 
10 amazon.com Amazon (USA)  
special search (products) 
recommendations (products) 
reputation (marketplace sellers) 
Source: Own, Ranking based on alexa.com, 15-07-2014 
 
Despite variations between different categories, market sizes tend to be high (e.g., 
search, computational advertising) and growth rates impressive (e.g., music and film 
streaming) for services and products based on algorithmic selection. 
 Markets pass through different phases in their life cycles: from experimental and 
expansion phases to maturity, stagnation and decline. Accordingly, they show different 
market structures, sizes and growth rates, and call for different business strategies and public 
policies. Based on a review of available market data, a rough appraisal of various types of 
algorithmic selection by market phases can be given. Most types are still in an experimental 
(e.g., algorithmic prognosis of the future success of films and music) or an early expansion 
phase (e.g., automated content production; scoring; surveillance) with comparatively low 
market sizes as yet, which can be expected to grow significantly in coming years. Examples 
of the expansion/growth phase are recommender systems for music and films (e.g., Spotify, 
Netflix) with high annual growth rates. Computational advertising markets can roughly be 
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classified within the maturity phase, and general search markets are already tending toward 
stagnation, with decreasing growth rates but impressive market sizes. These latter two 
categories show high concentration rates. Search markets are highly concentrated on a global 
scale, with regional market shares of Google Search up to 97% (see Table 1.3). The major 
display-ad-selling companies are Google and Facebook, which in 2013 possessed US ad 
revenue shares of 17.6% and 14.6% respectively. These shares are estimated to grow to 
24.6% for Google and 15.5% for Facebook in 2015, resulting in a concentration ratio CR2 of 
40.1% (eMarketer 2013). Concentration is not only evident for search and computational 
advertising. The leading US dating platform, for example, is match.com (Statista, June 2014), 
a brand belonging to InterActiveCorp (IAC), which in 2012 had a 41% US market share in 
online dating with its portfolio of online dating services, with the CR2 in online dating 
amounting to 64% (VanderMey 2013). 
 
Table 1.3: Concentration of search engine markets in selected countries, Europe and 
worldwide, (end of 2013) 
 
 Google 
(USA) 
Yahoo 
(USA) 
Bing 
(USA) 
Baidu 
(CHN) 
Yandex 
(RUS) 
Thailand 97.0%     
Spain 96.3% 0.9% 1.1%   
Vietnam 96.0%     
United Kingdom 94.2% 1.8% 2.7%   
Germany 94.1% 0.8% 1.6%   
France 92.8% 1.7% 2.6%   
India 90.0%     
Indonesia 88.0%     
Malaysia 87.0%     
Philippines 84.0%     
Singapore 84.0%     
USA 67.3% 10.8% 18.2%   
China 1.7% 0.3% 0.6% 63.6%  
Russia 26.5%    61.9% 
Japan* 36% 51.4%    
Europe* (18 
countries incl. RU) 
86.0%  1.0%  10.0% 
Worldwide* 65.2% 4.9% 2.5% 8.2% 2.8% 
Sources: ComScore 2013/2014 (Europe, ID, IN, MY, PH, SG, TH, US, VN), Bloomberg 2013 (RU), CNZZ 
2013 (CN), Schautzer 2013 (JP), AT Internet 2014 (DE, ES, FR, UK), Sullivan 2013 (worldwide); * 2012 data 
 
Concentration tendencies are a constituent feature of many of the Internet businesses 
that offer products and services that operate on algorithmic selection. Many of these can be 
described as two- or multisided platforms, operating on two- or multisided markets (Rochet 
and Tirole 2003) – a characteristic that has important interrelated economic, business and 
policy implications. In such cases, for example, the platform acts as an intermediary, as a 
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market maker, between (at least) two demand sides that are interlinked by indirect network 
effects, which may be one reason for concentration in these markets. 
 These concentration tendencies can be explained by various industrial economic 
characteristics such as cost structures, scale and scope economies, direct and indirect network 
effects. As with traditional media markets, cost structures for algorithmic selection markets 
are characterized by considerable economies of scale, resulting from high fixed and sunk cost 
(e.g., R&D, hardware and software maintenance), and extremely low marginal cost of 
additional selection processes (e.g., an additional music recommendation). Hence dominant 
players produce most efficiently, resulting in high market entry barriers due to efficiency 
deficits of new entrants. A large market size is often necessary to operate efficiently, an issue 
that is also evident when considering indirect network effects that arise when the number of 
participants on one side (positively or negatively) affects the number of participants on the 
other. Usually the participation of one group raises the value of participating for the other 
group. For example, the more users a search engine has, the greater the positive indirect 
effects on advertisers. Although advertising might be a nuisance for users, both sides need to 
join the platform for success – a task usually accomplished through the pricing structure, 
where a higher price is typically paid on the side that generates less positive network effects. 
 This leads to another important characteristic: algorithmic selection markets are 
predominantly characterized by quality and innovation competition and less by price 
competition. Many applications are free of charge for end customers. Hence the perceived 
quality of a service is particularly important for gaining competitive advantage. The quality of 
service depends, inter alia, on the quality of algorithms, hardware (e.g., server farms) and 
(input) data (Argenton and Prüfer 2012). Exclusive access to data by service suppliers who 
create data (e.g., social media companies) results in a strong competitive advantage. These 
data form an essential input for selection processes, and might lead to exclusive quality 
improvements on the input side, thus contributing to concentration tendencies. 
Moreover, exclusive access to user and usage data of one’s own service results in a 
competitive advantage for established players and forms a market-entry barrier for 
newcomers, because they will not be able to offer services of a comparable quality. In 
contrast to traditional media markets, the quality of services – in essence, the quality of 
selections – increases with the growing use of a service. The reason is that the results of 
earlier selections feed back into future selection processes and thus increase their quality. The 
quality of selections depends, inter alia, on the number of earlier selections, which is why 
more users and usage result in quality improvements of services. This is true for individual 
 14 
users (by improved personalization/customization of products that also increases users’ 
switching costs) and all other users as well. There are network effects, in other words 
demand-side scale effects. In addition, there is a positive feedback loop between network 
effects on the demand side and scale effects on the supply side. This again results in 
concentration tendencies, even in winner-takes-all markets with widening disparities. 
 Finally, concentration and market entry barriers are facilitated by considerable 
economies of scope, resulting from multiple exploitation of central resources, in particular of 
technological know-how – especially on algorithms, of hardware infrastructures and 
databases. Accordingly, many big players such as Google, Microsoft and Amazon are 
diversifying and offering a range of different types of algorithmic selection services, thus 
exploiting economies of scope. Among other things, Google offers search, advertising, 
aggregation and recommendation, Microsoft is active in search, advertising, surveillance, 
prognosis and aggregation, IBM in prognosis and surveillance. 
Moreover, there is a connection between market phases and market structures. Many 
algorithmic selection applications are still in the experimental phase or an early expansion 
phase. These phases are, in general, characterized by high concentration, by temporary 
monopolies of innovators and early movers.  In these early phases, innovators (often US 
companies in the case of algorithmic selection) also find favorable conditions to export and 
dominate markets abroad (e.g., Netflix). 
 
 
1.5. Business models of algorithmic selection 
 
Innovation theory suggests that potential benefits of technical innovations can best be 
exploited in combination with appropriate social/organizational innovations. Among such 
social innovations are business models that have long ‘been given short shrift in the 
innovation literature’ (Teece 2006, p. 1142), however. Awareness of the importance of 
business models has increased recently, not least because of the growth of the Internet, which 
both challenged and destroyed traditional business models and opened up debates about how 
to make money in an online environment that is characterized by expectations that services 
should be free (Teece 2010). Business models systematically describe the value proposition, 
the value creation as well as the revenue streams and cost structures (Osterwalder et al. 2005, 
Jaeggi 2010). They not only focus on companies’ products and services, but also on core 
resources and activities that are needed to create value, and on the channels of delivery to 
customers. 
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 Comparative business model analyses of algorithmic selection applications show 
common patterns for such services. Similarities are mostly found in services offered to end 
users, resulting in part from market characteristics (e.g., pricing in two- or multisided 
markets) or from imitation strategies in business models of similar services, whereas services 
for business and public service customers (e.g., the police) vary more widely, as they are 
frequently custom-made for specific purposes (Latzer et al. 2014). 
 
1.5.1 Value proposition 
 
Value propositions of suppliers of algorithmic selection applications reveal economic and 
social benefits for individuals, corporations, administrations and society. Among the 
economic benefits are reductions in transaction costs, cost and performance advantages, and 
customized problem-solving solutions (Klingenberg 2000; Zollenkop 2006). Predominantly, 
algorithmic selection promises to reduce various kinds of transaction costs, e.g., search and 
information costs – mostly in the case of search, filter, aggregation, and recommender 
applications – or information asymmetries, for example, through reputation systems. A 
reduction of transaction costs is also realized with allocation services (e.g., computational 
advertising and advertising networks, algorithmic trading) by mass-customized process 
automation and by replacing manpower by algorithms. The last of these is also evident in 
certain areas of content production (e.g., algorithmic journalism). In such cases, efficiency 
gains may be used differently by companies: to save costs or to increase the quality of other 
segments of content production, e.g., in the case of algorithmic journalism (van Dalen 2012). 
Various studies show that the reduction of search costs results in increased consumption and 
sales, e.g., increased news consumption because of news aggregators (Athey and Mobius 
2012; Chiou and Tucker 2013), increased TV consumption due to recommender systems 
(Pronk et al. 2009), or increased sales because of search and recommender systems in online 
stores (Hinz and Eckert 2010). 
Cost and performance advantages are especially manifest for business and public 
service customers.  In particular, for services in categories like surveillance and prognosis, as 
well as allocation and content production, algorithmic processing of big data offers 
advantages to corporate customers and public authorities. For example, computational 
advertising reduces losses due to personalization and pay-per-click possibilities, algorithmic 
trading services enter huge amounts of orders at a faster pace than humans, or predictive 
policing applications are useful in coordinating processes (e.g., stationing of policemen in 
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crime-prone areas). The possibilities of enhanced personalization and customization in 
particular are the basis of many customized solutions provided to customers by algorithmic 
selection services. 
 Social benefits of algorithmic selection services include their contribution to social 
orientation, information gathering and public-opinion formation. News aggregators (e.g., 
Google News, nachrichten.de), general search engines (e.g., Google, Bing), news-scoring 
applications (e.g., Reddit, Digg), automated content production and social online networks are 
expected to contribute to these social benefits. 
 
1.5.2 Value creation 
 
Various resources, skills and activities are needed to deliver value to consumers. Within the 
value creation system of algorithmic selection services there are core resources that are of 
particular relevance regarding the quality and thus competitive advantage of automated 
selection processes: technical expertise, especially regarding software/algorithms, the 
hardware infrastructure (e.g., server farms, computer networks) and access to and quality of 
data (information elements and externally produced data signals – see Figure 1.1). These 
influence the value-production chain, including R&D, data collection (input), selection 
processes (throughput) and the use, placement and distribution of selection results (output). 
  Providers of algorithmic selection applications fulfill different roles within the 
external value creation system (Heuskel 1999). Analyses indicate that they are most 
frequently active as market makers (intermediaries) or layer players (specialists), and less as 
orchestrators that outsource various stages of the value chain, yet occupy strategic position 
(e.g., Yahoo), or as integrators that integrate nearly all stages of the value chain in their 
companies (e.g., Google). 
  As platforms, in particular as market makers between suppliers and consumers (e.g., 
search engines, news aggregators, advertising networks, music and film streaming), they 
create new activities within the value chain and bring together products of different 
companies and offer those, or a selection, to potential customers. Based on this 
platformization of markets, these services increase transparency (e.g., comparability) and 
influence customer choice (decisions). Most of the algorithmic selection services directed at 
end users are active as market makers within the value-creation chain. 
 Another group of algorithmic selection services, the layer players, specialize in one 
particular stage of the value chain, which often results in superior knowledge and scale 
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effects. They fulfill this stage for individual companies, for a specific sector or across various 
sectors. Examples include surveillance, security, prognosis and content-production services. 
 For algorithmic selection applications, not only the various undisclosed algorithms but 
also the supply and the quality of selection elements and data signals are crucial for 
competitive advantages and economic success. There are different types of suppliers of 
selection elements: suppliers based on contracts who are financially compensated (e.g., music 
labels that license music for streaming services); customers who provide the data to service 
suppliers (e.g., police for predictive policing applications); and suppliers whose content is 
mostly used, some would say appropriated without approval and compensation (e.g., websites 
of newspapers). Such appropriation of content has raised serious concerns by competitors as it 
directly affects their profitability (see below). Finally, value creation by algorithmic selection 
is based, among other things, on the assessment of decentralized data signals in order to 
assign relevance to information elements (see Figure 1.1). Suppliers of decentralized data 
signals are, for example, Internet-based services that deliver user data with the consent of 
users, customers of services that provide data either by consent or unintentionally because 
they are unwittingly being tracked, and data companies that collect and sell different kinds of 
data (e.g., sports statistics, historic weather data). 
 
1.5.3 Revenue models 
 
Revenue models focus on the sources of revenue and on price setting. They are strongly 
influenced by the fact that algorithmic selection applications often serve different, 
interdependent customer segments in two- or multi-sided platform markets, where prices have 
to be weighted accordingly. As a consequence, in many cases the basic algorithmic selection 
services for end users are cross-subsidized, typically by advertising. Most search and social 
online networks, for example, offer their product for free to end users and charge the other 
side of the market, e.g., the advertisers, for access to them. Computational advertising has 
now developed into a very sophisticated way to reach target groups, among other things with 
the help of auctions. In contrast, most applications directed only at business and public 
service customers (e.g., security, prognosis) serve independent customer segments, and are 
therefore not usually constrained by price-setting strategies required in multi-sided markets. 
Indirect forms of revenue, both transaction-dependent and -independent, predominate 
in algorithmic selection markets, and direct transaction-dependent forms are rare. There are 
many indirect transaction-dependent forms of revenue generation, such as pay per click or 
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impression ads, Powerplay campaigns (e.g., LastFM) or Promoted Tweets. In many cases 
revenue is generated from a combination of different sources, however. This can be 
exemplified with various freemium services like Spotify or LinkedIn. Often a basic service – 
with limited features, usage restrictions, or offered in exchange for advertising – is free to the 
user, who is charged a premium, however, for services with added functionality, quality and 
no restrictions. Premium profiles are then a form of direct transaction-independent source of 
revenue, as are various subscription-only services like Netflix. 
 
1.6. Selected implications of algorithmic selection for traditional media markets 
 
The economic implications of algorithmic selection services are as wide as its fields of 
application in various sectors of the economy. This section focuses on media markets only, in 
particular on media incumbents’ profitability. For decades traditional news companies have 
dominated the construction of public spheres. They were unchallenged and made high profits 
in advertising markets. Now, both core businesses of news companies – the audience and 
advertising markets – are increasingly coming under pressure from activities of IT companies 
like Microsoft or dot-coms like Google or Yahoo. As market makers, they squeeze 
themselves between traditional news companies and their two customer segments, the 
audience and the advertisers (Águila-Obra et al. 2007). Their competitive advantages result 
from the generation of huge amounts of data and the automated algorithmic selection and 
placement of news, on the one hand, and from the automated selection and placement of 
advertisements on the other. News aggregators (e.g., Google News or Bing News) and online 
advertising networks (e.g., Google AdSense) are examples of such intermediaries. 
 Research on the impact of algorithmic selection on media industries predominantly 
focuses on news aggregators and online advertising, revealing that they increase both the 
reading consumptions and the quality of news (e.g., Athey and Mobius 2012; Chiou and 
Tucker 2013; Dellarocas et al. 2013) and have impacts on price strategies and targeting 
methods in online and offline advertising markets (Edelmann et al. 2005; Evans 2009; 
Bergmann and Bonatti 2011). Many other questions remain unanswered and call for further 
research, especially those regarding the combined economic impact of various algorithmic 
selection applications that affect both the audience and the advertising market. Moreover, the 
impact of algorithmic selection on other media industries such as music or film has not yet 
been examined. 
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 A basis for such analysis is Porter’s (2008) concept of five forces that shape industry 
competition, which has been applied, for example, by Maaß et al. (2009) to assess the 
robustness of concentration in search markets. Coupled with comparative analyses of business 
models and market structures, Porter’s approach also makes it possible to assess the impact of 
algorithmic selection applications such as news aggregators, algorithmic content production, 
computational advertising, music streaming or subscription video-on-demand services on the 
news, music, film and TV industries. Changes to the five competitive forces – the threat of 
new entrants and of substitute products and services, the bargaining power of both suppliers 
and buyers, and the rivalry among existing competitors – affect the average profitability of 
media incumbents. 
 Theoretical considerations suggest that algorithmic selection services predominantly 
come into effect as intermediaries or suppliers in media industries, and tend to change its 
profitability. In his overall assessment of the Internet, Porter (2001) argues that the Internet 
tends to decrease profitability. Theoretical analyses of algorithmic selection markets indicate 
that the impact on incumbents’ profitability seems to vary from media industry to media 
industry (Latzer et al. 2014). For example, in the news industry, algorithmic selection tends to 
decrease average profitability overall. Although incumbents benefit from added traffic 
streams (Chiou and Tucker 2013; Dellarocas et al. 2013) and from integrating algorithmic 
selection (e.g., news created by algorithms) as an ancillary function, intermediaries such as 
news aggregators or advertising networks change the forces of the industry to the 
disadvantage of incumbents. Increasingly high concentration in these markets is shifting the 
bargaining power to these intermediary platforms and allowing them to amplify their market 
power. This is especially the case if they are able to establish themselves as bottleneck 
monopolists that control the access to products of others (Shelanski 2013), as in the case of 
news publishers’ content or as evident in the struggles between the bookselling industries, and 
lately Disney, and Amazon. Some have turned to opt-out options, e.g., by blocking their sites 
for search engines (e.g., News Corp. blocked Google services by using robot.txt files). Opting 
out of search services has not been a feasible solution for publishers, however. Search 
engines, for example, are responsible for high visitor streams to news websites, with widely 
differing figures up to 35% (SimilarWeb.com 2013). Further, aggregation of news in single 
access points also results in lower transaction and switching costs for news customers and 
tends to increase their bargaining power. As new entrants, online advertising networks in 
particular are straining incumbents’ profitability. 
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 For the music industry, in contrast, it can be argued that algorithmic selection tends to 
increase incumbents’ profitability overall, as music-streaming services (e.g., Last.FM, 
Spotify) strongly stimulate (legal) music consumption and have been revenue drivers in 
recent years. Although they also established themselves as intermediaries they are faced with 
a highly concentrated music industry with great bargaining power. 
The differences in impact on various media industries can be explained by different 
business models of algorithmic selection services (market makers, layer players) and by the 
different stages of market development (market phases) of the relevant algorithmic selection 
services as well as business models and market structures of traditional industries (Latzer et 
al. 2014). 
 These first rough estimates and theoretical considerations of the possible impact of 
algorithmic selection on media industries still need further research, and in particular need to 
be combined and weighed with current market data in order to receive an accurate picture of 
the real economic implications for media industries. 
 
1.7. Social risks 
 
Algorithmic selection and attendant personal data collection have become objects of public 
concern and have raised questions about their impact on society as well as the need for public 
policy. Generally, the assessment of risks is an appropriate method to relate estimated 
economic and social benefits to risks, for example, the benefits gained by search engines in 
managing information overflow versus the risk to user privacy. A first step in such analysis is 
generally to identify possible risks and benefits and assess the probability of their occurrence 
and the number of people affected (e.g., how many people or institutions use an algorithmic 
application? Do these people or institutions have a multiplying effect? How often and how 
intensively do people/institutions use the application?). 
 The various risks of algorithmic selection applications found in the literature are here 
grouped in three overlapping categories, which in particular indicate that such analysis not 
only touches upon cost-benefit calculations but also extends into ethical/moral value 
judgments as well: (1) threats to basic rights and liberties, (2) impacts on the mediation of 
reality, and (3) challenges to the future development of the human species. Overall, eight 
specific risks can be distinguished that accompany the diffusion of algorithmic selection: (1) 
manipulation, (2) diminishing variety, the creation of biases and distortions of reality, (3) 
constraints on the freedom of communication and expression, (4) threats to data protection 
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and privacy, (5) social discrimination, (6) violation of intellectual property rights, (7) possible 
transformations and adaptations of the human brain, and (8) uncertain effects of the power of 
algorithms on humans, e.g., growing independence of human control and growing human 
dependence on algorithms. 
 Empirical examples of manipulation are ‘Google bombs’ (e.g., Bar-Ilan 2007), 
described as planned massive influence on search results, or the improvement of websites 
through search-engine optimization. Manipulations have also been identified for 
recommender and reputation systems for goods and services such as hotel or product 
recommendations (e.g., Rietjens 2006; Schormann 2012). Algorithmic selection is 
furthermore associated with bias inasmuch as it is presumed to develop an algorithmic reality 
where content is only visible when it is produced and shaped according to the rules that 
algorithmic selection prescribes (Zhang and Dimitroff 2005; Cushing Weigle 2013). The rules 
themselves leave out certain aspects of reality and have incorporated specific values that 
unknowingly discriminate against particular content. Qualified empirical evidence for this 
phenomenon is rare, but various authors have discussed the self-enforcing mechanisms of 
algorithms and their biasing effects (e.g., filter bubble, Pariser 2011), or the creation of a 
digital divide on a content and usage level (Segev 2010). Accordingly, the much-discussed 
media realities reach a new level, leading to discussions about algorithmic realities that follow 
different, increasingly automated and commercialized rules. 
Constraints on the freedom of communication are also identified as a possible risk of 
algorithmic selection – an argument derived largely from its technological design. As the 
name implies, it has a selective element that can be shaped, with differing effects, however. 
On the one hand it can be used to gain access to relevant content or to protect IP rights or to 
keep children from accessing harmful content (Hinman 2005). On the other hand, algorithmic 
selection may be adopted to diminish the democratic potential of digital media by being used 
for censorship (Zittrain and Palfrey 2008). 
To fulfill their role as information intermediaries and information brokers, algorithmic 
selection applications have to rely on content produced by third parties and on data produced 
by consumers. Both sources of information involve certain risks. It is argued that, without 
infringing the intellectual property rights of content producers and distributors, many 
applications such as search engines, information aggregators or recommender systems would 
have no data basis on which to build their services (Stühmeier 2011). This kind of use of 
third-party content has led to disputes over copyright and other intellectual property rights, 
and publishers all over the world have sued Google for infringing such laws (Clark 2010, 
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2012; Chiou and Tucker 2013; Quinn 2014). Moreover, many algorithmic selection 
applications are personalized/customized applications, i.e. applications that use data collected 
from the users to personalize results. This incorporates great risks concerning users’ privacy 
and data protection. Today, personal data has become the new oil for the economy (World 
Economic Forum 2011b) and operators of algorithmic selection applications are major 
collectors of such data online. They use these data to customize services and monetize them 
(as an exchange for other/more data or by selling them directly) – activities that have resulted 
in various data privacy challenges (Chaleppa and Sin 2005; Zimmer 2008; Xu et al 2011; 
Toch et al. 2012). Algorithmic applications also raise debates concerning their influence on 
human cognitive abilities – a pressing object for future research. Current discussions range 
between questions of whether these applications result in the loss of abilities (Carr 2010; 
Henig and Henig 2012) or whether they are simply helping in allocating cognitive resources 
more efficiently, like other technologies in history (Sparrow 2011). Finally, there is a general 
discussion on how the relationship between humans and algorithms can be described and how 
this man-machine relationship will develop or should be shaped in the near future (Bunz 
2012; Schirrmacher 2013). This includes questions about the power of algorithms, about 
whether humans are still able to control them or to what extent they control human behavior 
and development. 
 There are economic motives that promote major risks such as manipulation, threats to 
privacy or the infringement of IP laws. These motives are mainly predicated on efforts to 
maintain and amplify market power, e.g., by prioritizing one’s own services in search results 
and excluding others – a concern that has raised discussions of whether search results should 
be subject to a search neutrality principle (Lao 2013), for example. Systematic manipulation 
is said to be mainly applied where goods, services and information are sold, or where trust in 
transactions needs to be built (e.g., deceptive recommendations). Major groups affected are 
search engines and recommender systems. New markets of manipulation evolved around 
algorithmic applications, such as search-engine optimization and marketing agencies as well 
as web-content-production agencies. In the meantime, they have become a vital and essential 
branch of the rapidly growing e-commerce sector. 
 Altogether, the production of economic wealth by algorithmic selection co-evolves 
with the emergence of social risks. Algorithmic selection leads to a 
commercialization/economization of automated reality mining and construction. The 
construction of realities – well known from research on traditional media – is not only 
automated by algorithmic selection and extended to further aspects of life but at the same time 
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increasingly oriented on economic and less on social rationales. As a consequence of these 
increasingly automated and commercialized mining and formations of realities on the 
Internet, certain forms of governance seem to be necessary and are being discussed in order to 
realize the economic and social welfare goals anticipated by algorithmic selection. 
 
1.8. Risk reduction by market solutions and governance choice: opportunities and 
limitations 
There are two perspectives on governance and algorithms: governance by algorithms refers to 
the above-mentioned power of technology and the ability of algorithms to shape society; 
governance of algorithms refers to the practices to control, shape and regulate algorithms. In 
connection with the increasing awareness of risks, the opportunities for a social shaping of 
algorithmic selection by means of governance have attracted increased attention, most 
prominently the governance of search applications (e.g., Moffat 2009; Langford 2013; 
Lewandowski 2014). Further, disputes on certain practices and implications of news 
aggregation, search and algorithmic trading have resulted in regulatory provisions such as the 
German ancillary copyright law (BGBl. 2013, part 1, no. 23, p. 1161), the right to be 
forgotten for search engines in the EU (ECJ, judgment C-131/12 Google Spain vs. AEPD and 
Mario Costeja Gonzalez), and measures to prevent stock market crashes caused by algo 
trading, e.g., the European Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID 2, 
2014/65/EU). 
This section discusses justifications, opportunities and limitations for the governance 
of algorithmic selection. From a public-interest point of view, governance should reinforce 
benefits and minimize risks. Benefits and risks are tightly interlinked, because risks are 
central barriers for the exploitation of potential benefits. Accordingly, a ‘risk-based approach’ 
(Black 2010) examines the risks and explores the opportunities and limitations to reduce 
them. There are various arrangements to reduce risks and increase the benefits of algorithmic 
selection, ranging from market mechanisms at one end, to command and control regulation by 
state authorities at the other (Latzer et al. 2002; 2003). In between there are several additional 
governance options: self-organization by individual companies; (collective) industry self-
regulation; and co-regulation – regulatory cooperation between state authorities and the 
industry. The subsequent analyses of opportunities and limitations of governance options 
reveal that there are no one-size-fits-all solutions for the governance of algorithms. Moreover 
they show that governance of algorithms does not just mean regulating the actual code, the 
technology itself (Brown and Marsden 2013). More often, the primary targets of governance 
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interventions are organizational settings, e.g., the business models in the case of the ancillary 
copyright, with direct ramifications for the economics of the markets concerned. And finally, 
the analyses indicate that adequate governance strategies do not solely rely on one type of 
actor (e.g., the state, an industry association or companies), but often call for an interplay 
between the various levels and actors involved. 
 
1.8.1 Market solutions: risk-reduction strategies by consumers, content providers and 
suppliers 
 
Not all risks of algorithmic selection necessarily call for regulation. Risks may also be 
reduced by (voluntary) changes in the market conduct of consumers, suppliers of algorithmic 
services and by providers of the content that is processed by algorithms. 
Consumers and providers of content may refrain from using problematic services, 
switch to other service providers or make use of technologies to protect themselves against 
risks. There are, for instance, technical self-help solutions for consumers in the case of 
censorship, bias and privacy violations, e.g., tools for anonymization and de-personalization 
of services. Content providers could avoid violations of copyright by using robots.txt files. In 
areas like search, recommendation and filtering, a digital arms race is observable, where 
market participants are trying to avoid disadvantages by using content-optimization strategies 
(Wittel and Wu 2004; Jansen 2007). Insights from behavioral economics applied to the 
Internet of things might help in understanding the motivations and practice of market 
participants for using technological design for self-help (Fleisch 2010). Moreover, public 
awareness campaigns regarding risks of algorithmic selection (governance by information) 
might support a more risk sensible market conduct. 
However, there are also several limitations to self-help for consumers and content 
providers. Algorithmic applications often work without explicit consent and opt-out 
possibilities, e.g., from state and company surveillance programs. Switching service providers 
requires the existence of alternative services, but several markets are highly concentrated. If 
there are hardly any alternative suppliers, the switching opportunities are limited. For 
consumers, information asymmetries often make the risks of algorithmic selection barely 
visible, hence a direct motivation for consumer reaction is missing. Moreover, the usage of 
algorithmic services is mostly a low cost situation for users, because services are cross-
subsidized by advertising. The absence of costs decreases the incentives to switch to lower-
risk alternatives. Finally, behavioral economics point out that even if costs and risks are 
detectable, consumers often do not carefully calculate the precise costs and benefits of their 
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decisions (bounded rationality). Instead they rely on cognitive biases, which not always 
increase their long-term benefits, e.g., regarding the self-protection of privacy (Acquisti and 
Grossklags 2005).  
 Suppliers of algorithmic selection services may counter risks by product innovations, 
i.e. with new services or technological modifications of established ones. In such a case, the 
reduction of risks is part of the business strategy. There are, for example, services that aim at 
avoiding bias and violations of privacy and copyright in the first place. Some news 
aggregators’ business models integrate content providers, who receive compensation (e.g., 
nachrichten.de). Other algorithmic services do not collect user data (e.g., the search engine 
DuckDuckGo). Services such as ConsiderIt, Reflect and OpinionSpace are designed to avoid 
filter bubbles and bias and integrate elements of serendipity (Munson and Resnick 2010; 
Schedl et al. 2012; Resnick et al. 2013). To increase privacy standards, services may apply 
privacy by default and privacy by design on the technological level (Schaar 2010; Cavoukia 
2012). But there are also several limitations on the reduction of risks by market strategies of 
service suppliers. There are high entry barriers in some market segments, and the conditions 
for newcomers and product innovations are difficult. Low-risk alternatives are mostly niche 
products with a very limited number of users and the reduction of risks may be accompanied 
by a quality reduction. Moreover, a low number of users and reduced quality may mutually 
reinforce each other and further decrease the attractiveness of niche services. Altogether, for 
the reduction of risks it is not advisable to rely on market forces only. 
 
1.8.2 Self-organization by individual companies 
 
Individual suppliers of algorithmic services may reduce risks or strengthen their 
accountability by means of ‘self-organization’. Typical measures are principles and standards, 
which reflect the public interest, internal quality assessment and ombudsmen at the corporate 
level. The commitment to self-organization is often part of a broader corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) strategy. From an economic point of view the purpose is to increase a 
company’s reputation or to avoid reputation losses. 
 Suppliers of algorithmic services can commit themselves to certain ‘values’ (Introna 
and Nissenbaum 2000), such as search neutrality or the minimum principle for data collection 
for instance (Langheinrich 2001; Cavoukia 2009). Ethic boards may be an option for issues 
with ethical implications such as software development or interferences with user experience. 
For risks such as censorship, discrimination, bias and manipulation, companies may further 
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adopt principles and internal quality control. Qualified personnel are essential for quality 
assessment and conflict resolution. For big data, in-house algorithmists have been suggested 
to oversee big-data operations, and who would be the first points of contact for people who 
feel harmed by an organization’s big-data predictions (Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 2013). 
Additionally, more transparency is one of the strategies to better inform consumers and 
facilitate the market mechanism, because the lack of transparency is one of the reasons for 
market failure in the area of algorithmic selection. 
However, several potential barriers may inhibit voluntary measures at company level. 
Self-organization depends on incentives, i.e., benefits and cost for the company. However, the 
benefits of high standards of data protection (Hustinx 2010; London Economics 2010) and of 
the disclosure of the codes/algorithms may be limited. Disclosure would increase 
transparency, but also the danger of manipulation and imitation, resulting in the ‘transparency 
dilemma’ (Rieder 2005; Bracha and Pasquale 2008; Granka 2010). The willingness for self-
restrictions also depends on reputational factors. High levels of public attention on well-
known companies in B2C markets may promote self-organization in the public interest. 
Google, for instance, runs an ethics board at the company level (Lin and Selinger 2014). Little 
public awareness of companies in B2B markets, such as dater brokers (e.g., Acxiom, 
Corelogic and Datalogix; see FTC 2014) reduces the reputational sensitivity and therefore 
also the preconditions for voluntary self-organization. Finally, the suitability of self-
organization depends on the type of risk. It is not suitable, for example, for reducing problems 
like market concentration and transformations of cognitive capabilities. 
 
1.8.3 Self-regulation by the industry 
 
Self-regulation refers to collective self-restrictions of a branch in order to pursue public 
objectives. Typical instruments are codes of conduct, industry standards, quality seals and 
certification bodies, ombudsman schemes and ethic committees. 
There are sectoral initiatives of self-regulation in the advertising industry (e.g., USA, 
Europe), the search engine market (e.g., Germany), social online networks (e.g., Europe) and 
in the domain of algo trading. These initiatives deal with risks such as violations of privacy 
and copyright, manipulation and controllability. In the advertising industry there are 
initiatives for the technical standardization of do-not-track (DNT) and for better data 
protection in the area of online behavioral advertising (OBA). Additionally, there are 
organizational and technical industry standards for the protection of copyright, e.g., the 
creative commons licensing system and digital rights management systems (DRM). 
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Moreover, certification schemes, ombudsmen and ethics commissions seem to be appropriate 
instruments for dealing with controversial issues such as bias, manipulation, restrictions on 
communications and controllability of applications. However, these options have hardly been 
taken up by the industry so far. 
 There are reasons why self-regulation for algorithmic selection has not yet been 
comprehensively applied and suggestions as to how the conditions could be improved. 
Algorithmic selection is applied in a wide range of sectors. Due to the large number and the 
heterogeneity of the branches involved a common overall self-regulatory initiative is unlikely. 
In order to get a grip on fragmentation the establishment of a profession of ‘algorithmists’ and 
special professional rules and ethics have been suggested (Meyer-Schönberger and Cuckier 
2013). However, there are additional factors that inhibit self-regulation. For instance, self-
regulation is more likely to occur in mature industries with like-minded market players.  But 
some of the markets are rather new (e.g., algorithmic content production) and often the 
developers of algorithmic solutions want to challenge established players and do not 
voluntarily comply with older industry schemes. Minimum standards that apply to all market 
participants would then have to be introduced by statutory regulation. In particular, self-
regulation is not suitable in cases where there is a sharp divergence between public and 
private interests, and where damage in the case of regulatory failure would be high (Latzer 
2007; Saurwein 2011). 
 
1.8.4 Co-regulation and state regulation 
 
The limitations of market mechanisms and self-regulation in reducing the risks can provide 
reasons and justifications for state intervention in algorithmic selection. Typical instruments 
of state intervention are: command and control regulation, incentives by subsidies/funding 
and taxes/fees, soft law and information measures. 
 In practice there are several examples of state influence in the domain of algorithmic 
selection, and regulations are related to particular risks rather than to a certain sector or a 
special technology. There are command and control regulations for violations of privacy and 
copyright, freedom of expression and fair competition. For example, in Europe, the privacy 
protection directive (95/46/EC, Art. 15) protects people against automated individual 
decisions on certain personal aspects such as performance at work, creditworthiness, 
reliability and conduct. In the area of privacy protection the development of privacy-
enhancing technologies (PETs) is funded by the EU, and some have even suggested 
introducing a data fee/tax in order to decrease the economic incentives for data collection 
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(Lanier 2013, Collin and Colin 2013). Co-regulation has been established with the safe-
harbor principles and with data protection certification schemes and seals of quality. Another 
area of ongoing regulatory debate is search. Due to concerns regarding fair competition, 
Google was the subject of investigations by US and European competition authorities, 
because competitors claimed that a Google search gives undue preference to the company’s 
other services. Some regulatory suggestions for the search-engine market aim at increased 
transparency and controllability by public authorities (e.g. algorithm disclosure requirements), 
while others propose cutting the barriers to market entry (Schulz et al. 2005). A publicly 
funded ‘index of the web’ (Lewandowski 2014) or user data sets (Argenton and Prüfer 2012) 
are suggested to be common resources in order to enhance market contestability, facilitate 
market entry and promote competition. Altogether, state intervention is multifaceted in the 
area of data protection, and there are many suggestions for regulating searches. But state 
intervention does not apply to all the problems of algorithmic selection. As for risks such as 
bias, uncontrollability and effects on cognitive capabilities, for instance, there are hardly any 
measures or suggestions for state intervention via regulation. In some of these areas it might 
be helpful to promote consumer awareness (governance by information), enhance user media 
literacy and stimulate conscious usage and self-protection abilities. Since algorithmic 
selection also involves ethical concerns, political actors may consider the appointment of 
ethical committees with broad stakeholder involvement to deal with conflicting values. It is 
evident that not all types of risk are suited to state intervention and when it comes to 
regulatory choice one also has to bear in mind the disadvantages of state regulation as 
compared to self-regulation, e.g., higher regulatory costs to the state, lower regulatory 
flexibility, and lower industry commitment to comply with regulations (Latzer et al. 2002; 
Bartle and Vass 2005).  
 
1.9 Conclusion 
This paper offers an innovation-co-evolution-complexity perspective on algorithmic selection 
on the Internet, a rapidly growing phenomenon, characterized by automated selection of 
information elements and the assignment of relevance to them. Algorithmic selection 
automates the commercialization of reality mining and reality construction in a fast growing 
number of fields of life in information societies. This radical and potentially disruptive bundle 
of innovations has far-reaching economic implications for existing and emerging markets. It 
challenges traditional business strategies, guides our actions and thereby influences economic 
success or failure. The production of economic wealth by algorithmic selection co-evolves 
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with the production of social risks and with governance efforts that try to curb risks and 
thereby boost socio-economic welfare gains. This paper proposes a typology that covers nine 
categories including search, aggregation, recommendation, surveillance, allocation and 
scoring applications and describes their operation with a basic input-throughput-output model. 
Although these services share a common basic functionality, their modes of operation as well 
as their economic and social implications differ in detail. 
 Applications are in different market phases. Many services are still in an experimental 
phase, others in the expansion or stagnation phase and show impressive growth rates or high 
market sizes respectively. A combination of various industrial economic characteristics (e.g., 
cost structures, scale and scope economies, direct and indirect network effects) and the 
availability of essential core resources (e.g., technical expertise, hardware infrastructure, 
access to and quality of data) facilitate concentration tendencies and the subsequent 
preservation and amplification of market power. 
 Comparative business model analyses of algorithmic selection applications reveal 
similarities in services offered to end users, resulting in part from market characteristics (e.g., 
pricing in two- or multisided markets) or from imitation strategies. Services for business and 
public service customers, on the other hand, vary more widely, because they are frequently 
custom-made for specific purposes. 
 Algorithmic selection promises to reduce various kinds of transaction costs (e.g., 
search and information costs, information asymmetries) and as a result increases consumption 
and sales, and facilitates social orientation. Providers of algorithmic selection are mostly 
active as market makers (intermediaries) or layer players (specialists), and less as 
orchestrators or integrators. Revenues strategies in these markets depend on the fact that 
algorithmic selection applications often serve different, interdependent customer segments in 
two- or multi-sided markets, where prices have to be weighted accordingly and cross-
subsidizing is indispensible. As a result, indirect forms of revenue predominate. 
 The effects on traditional media incumbents’ profitability vary from industry to 
industry. Theoretical considerations indicate a tendency to decreasing profitability for 
incumbents of the news industry and a tendency towards a profitability increase in the music 
industry, as music-streaming services have been pushing revenues of the traditional music 
industry and have enhanced legal music consumption. 
 Products and services based on algorithmic selection have become vital and essential 
for the generation of economic wealth but are also compromised by the production of social 
risks, among other things, threats to basic rights and liberties as well as impacts on the 
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mediation of realities and people’s future development. The emergence of social risks is 
coupled with discussions of whether and what governance approaches are appropriate to 
remedy such risks. Analyses indicate that there are no one-size-fits all solutions, and that 
there is the need for a governance mix consistent with the respective risks and applications in 
questions. Adequate governance strategies often call for an interplay between the various 
levels and actors involved (e.g., self-help of consumers depends, among other things, on 
organizational or technical dispositions). Finally, governance measures are not only directed 
towards the algorithms (technical design) alone, but predominantly target organizational 
settings, e.g. the business models and strategies, with far-reaching effects for the economics 
of the markets concerned. 
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